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**TO REPORT OF
BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL**

Submitted to
THE PRESIDENT
and
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

on

**The Shifting Balance
of
Military Power**

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The Shifting Balance of Military Power

This Statement is respectfully submitted to The President and The Secretary of Defense as a supplement to the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel.

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September 30, 1970

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PREFACE

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969, submitted its Report on July 1, 1970. Members of the Panel reserved the right to submit supplemental statements on areas not addressed by the Panel's Report. This is submitted, pursuant to that reservation, by the Panel members named below.

The statement which follows deals with the balance of strategic military power at a time when the convergence of a number of trends indicates a shifting of this balance against the United States. In the course of the Panel's study during the past year, it became increasingly clear to the undersigned that if these observable trends continue the United States will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people.

The President and the Secretary of Defense are fully aware of the trends which cause deep concern, and have brought these to the attention of the Congress and the public in formal reports and addresses. Yet much of the public remains uninformed and apathetic. This supplemental statement is submitted with the hope that it will contribute to public discussion and in the end to the informed public understanding which is essential in a democracy.

Now a word about the scope of this statement: It does not purport to be an exhaustive assessment of the comparative military capabilities of the U.S. and the Communist superpowers, as this can best be done by intelligence experts. Nor does it address directly the specific defense and foreign policy issues which must be resolved by the Administration and the Congress. Rather, the statement deals generally with the disquieting trends which affect adversely the strategic posture and influence of this country; with the continuing buildup of Soviet and Red Chinese nuclear capabilities, including an apparent Soviet pre-emptive strike capability; with the vital issue of technological supremacy; and with attitudes on the domestic front which tend to inhibit the needed public debate and thoughtful reexamination of defense policies and priorities.

It is hoped that this statement will help stimulate this debate and reexamination, with a resulting wider public understanding that the

balance of military power is shifting against the United States, and that the first duty of the national government is to "provide for the common defense" of our country.*

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* Preamble to U.S. Constitution.

SUMMARY

The principal points in the accompanying Statement may be summarized as follows:*

The Converging Trends. The convergence of a number of trends indicates a significant shifting of the strategic military balance against the United States and in favor of the Soviet Union.** These trends include: (i) the growing Soviet superiority in ICBM's; (ii) the Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons, with the continued deployment thereof; (iii) the possibility that present U.S. technological superiority will be lost to the Soviet Union; (iv) the convincing evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability; (v) the rapidly expanding Soviet naval capability; and (vi) the mounting hostility of segments of the public towards the military, the defense establishment and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken the only forces which provide security for the U.S.

A Second-Rate Power. If these observable trends continue the U.S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people. Neither the facts concerning these trends nor the ultimate danger is generally understood by the public, which for the most part remains uninformed and hence apathetic.

A Soviet World Order. Since World War II a degree of world order has been maintained by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. This American preserved world order is now disintegrating, as doubts arise as to our will and strength to preserve it. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions a new era which it will dominate, employing superior military power and the threat of its use to achieve long-cherished political, economic and even military objectives.

* This Summary is necessarily incomplete and reference should be made to the full Statement for the views of the authors.

** The principal threat to U.S. security for the 70's is the Soviet Union, and this paper is addressed primarily to that threat. By the late 70's and beyond, the most menacing country in the world may be Red China.

The End of U.S. Superiority. In a dramatic shift in the balance of power, largely unnoticed by the public, the quarter century of clear U.S. strategic superiority has ended. The Soviet Union has moved significantly ahead of the United States in ICBM's, the principal weapons system of the nuclear age. The U.S. retains, for the time being, a substantial edge in the smaller, short-range SLBM's launched from Polaris submarines. Yet, the Soviet Union has a major submarine construction program which by 1973-74 could nullify this advantage. The U.S. subsonic B-52 bomber force still outnumbers the Soviet strategic bombers by a three to one margin, but both nations recognize the relatively obsolete character of this weapons system.

There are, of course, other elements in the equation of strategic military power. In some of these—such as MIRV and Poseidon—the U.S. is ahead of the Soviet Union. In others—such as strategic defense against missiles (ABM's) and against bomber attack—the Soviets are significantly ahead.

But however one may view the balancing, no informed person now denies that the period of clear U.S. superiority has ended. The Soviet SS-9 ICBM force alone is capable of delivering a megatonnage of nuclear warheads several times greater than that of the entire U.S. force of ICBM's and SLBM's.

A Soviet First-Strike Capability. Our planners in the 60's assumed that if both superpowers had an adequate retaliatory capability neither would prepare for or risk a first strike. The evidence is now reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union, rejecting this assumption, is deploying strategic weapons systems designed for a first-strike capability. This evidence includes: (i) the continued Soviet production and deployment of ICBM's *after* having attained a clear numerical and megatonnage advantage; (ii) the emphasis on SS-9's designed as counter-force weapons capable of destroying U.S. hardened missile silos; (iii) the development of MRV with warheads also designed as counter-force weapons, and of MIRV by 1971-72; (iv) the development of a fractional orbital missile which significantly minimizes warning time; (v) the construction of a Y-class atomic powered submarine SLBM launching fleet capable, with no effective warning, of destroying our national command centers and much of our B-52 bomber force; and (vi) the continued Soviet emphasis on strategic defense

systems against both missiles and bombers—an emphasis without parallel in this country.

The characteristics of these offensive and defensive weapons systems, which the Soviets continue to expand, are consistent only with a preemptive strike capability. Such a weapons mix and volume are not required for effective retaliation.

A Challenging Soviet Navy. The Soviet navy, modern and rapidly expanding, is now challenging U.S. naval superiority in every category except aircraft carriers. This Soviet naval buildup is a major element in the shifting balance of military power.

Retreat from the Threat of the 70's. The situation which our country faces is without precedent. As we enter the 70's, the strategy of American superiority has given way to the concept of deterrence by maintaining an assured retaliatory capability. But there is no longer any certainty that our nuclear deterrent will remain credible to a Soviet Union which apparently seeks a preemptive strike capability, and which is moving rapidly into the role of the world's dominant military power. Red China, bitterly hostile to the U.S., also is acquiring a significant ICBM capability. It is not too much to say that in the 70's neither the vital interests of the U.S. nor the lives and freedom of its citizens will be secure.

Yet, many of our most influential citizens respond to this unprecedented national peril, not by a renewed determination to assure an adequate national defense, but rather by demands for further curtailment of defense measures which can only increase the peril.

Cutback in Defense Spending. Although the President has submitted for FY 1971 a "bare bones" defense budget, reflecting the largest single cutback since the Korean War, public and political pressures are mounting for even more drastic reductions. As U.S. defense spending goes down, the trend of spending by the Soviet Union continues steadily upward. Its total military funding about equals that of the U.S., although its gross national product is barely half that of this country. The mix of Soviet spending is especially meaningful. Without the drain of a Vietnam War or public pressures to curtail defense funding, Soviet expenditures in dollar equivalents on strategic offensive and defensive weapons significantly exceed those of the U.S.

Threat to Technological Superiority. U.S. qualitative superiority in weapons, due to its advanced technology, has afforded a decisive advantage over the past years. This advantage is now being eroded away, as the U.S. falls behind the Soviet Union in the support of R&D and in the training of scientists and engineers. There is an ever present risk of disastrous technological surprise in major weaponry where an open society is in competition with a closed Communist society. We are neglecting, by inadequate support and planning, to minimize this risk.

Negotiations—Trap or Opportunity? Since the end of World War II repeated attempts have been made by the U.S. to negotiate limitations on the "arms race." Negotiations for sound enforceable limitations should be continued and hopes are now high for the success of the current SALT talks. But the total experience of negotiating with Communist nations suggests the utmost caution and the need for the most critical analysis of the possible consequences of any proposed terms. Not only is the security of this country at stake, but it is possible that a limitations agreement as to strategic weapons could have the effect of neutralizing the U.S. as a strategic power, leaving the Soviet Union and Red China relatively free to employ their superior tactical capabilities wherever this seems advantageous.

Hostility Towards the Military. At this critical time, when the balance of military power is shifting, it is uniquely unfortunate that public hostility toward national defense and the military is at an unprecedented level. This attitude reflects a broad spectrum of opinion from honest pacifists and dissenters over Southeast Asia to New Leftist revolutionaries. But the base is sufficiently broad, and the voices supporting various aspects of it sufficiently powerful, to have a profoundly adverse effect upon almost every aspect of national defense. In a democracy, national defense suffers when there is inadequate public understanding and support. It may be fatally undermined when a significant segment of public opinion is not merely negative but irresponsibly hostile.

A Viable National Strategy. Unless the American people wish to accept irrevocably the status of a second-rate power—with all of the probable consequences—the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability. This can be accom-

plished by reversing the trends identified above, and by eschewing agreements which freeze the U.S. into a second-rate status. The margin of our overall strategic strength must be sufficient to convince the most reckless aggressor that, even after a surprise first strike, the capability to retaliate will in fact survive and be adequate to impose unacceptable destruction on the aggressor nation. This course of action is not incompatible with continued negotiations for arms limitations. Indeed, it will significantly enhance the chances of negotiations being genuinely fruitful without constituting a trap.

The Consequences of Second-Rate Status. Basic Communist dogma contemplates the employment—over such time spans as may be necessary—of the entire arsenal of pressures against the U.S. as the strongest democratic power. Despite discord among Communist states, there has been no amelioration of this doctrinal goal. Throughout the past quarter century, when the Soviet Union was relatively weak strategically, it precipitated or supported crisis upon crisis—directly or through puppets and satellites—designed to extend its influence and to create disarray within the U.S. and the Free World.

It is irrational to think, with the balance of military power shifting in its favor, that the policies of the Soviet Union will be less hostile, disruptive and imperialistic.

The consequences of being second rate, even if national survival is not threatened, could be seriously detrimental to the most vital diplomatic and economic interests of this country.

Weakness—The Gravest Threat to Peace. The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive. Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—could be the gravest threat to the peace of the world.

The Shifting Balance of Military Power

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel's assigned mission, though broadly defined, was related primarily to the organization and functioning of the Department of Defense and the Armed Services. The Panel was not requested to consider matters of national policy such as strategic posture, force levels, weapons systems and defense spending.

But one cannot spend a year studying the defense structure of this country without considering the vital questions of national defense policy. In the course of this study, it became increasingly clear that the balance of strategic military power is continuing to shift against the U.S.

In his Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon said:

"The overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe."¹

If observable trends continue—in this country and abroad—there is grave doubt whether this purpose can be attained for the 1970's and beyond. The warning by Secretary Laird that the U.S. could be "in a second-rate strategic position . . . by the mid-1970's" appears to be fully justified.² Indeed, if these trends continue, the U.S. will become a second-rate power incapable of assuring the future security and freedom of its people.

¹ U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, Report to the Congress by President Nixon, Feb. 18, 1970, p. 122. (Referred to herein as the President's Report.)

² Defense Report for Fiscal Year 1971, by Secretary Laird before the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations, Feb. 25, 1970, p. 1. (Referred to herein as the Laird Report.)

TRENDS WHICH ENDANGER U.S. SECURITY

The trends which are combining to shift the strategic balance of power in favor of the Soviet Union include:

1. The Soviet deployment of types and numbers of offensive and defensive nuclear strategic weapons which threaten the security of this country.
2. The Soviet commitment of greater resources than the U.S. to strategic offensive and defensive weapons and weapons systems.
3. The Soviet commitment of greater manpower and resources than the U.S. to military-related research and development (R&D), thus threatening to end U.S. technological superiority.
4. The evidence that the Soviet Union seeks a preemptive first-strike capability.
5. The Soviet deployment of a fleet capable of challenging the U.S. fleet.
6. The abandonment by the U.S. of its former policy of maintaining strategic superiority.
7. The state of mind of much of the U.S. public which tends to inhibit necessary defense measures and even the full and rational discussion of the need for such measures.
8. The tendency of many to attack and criticize, whether justified or not, the military, the defense establishment, and "the military-industrial complex," without due recognition that sustained irresponsible criticism could undermine and weaken—at a critical time in history—the only forces which provide security for the U.S. and the free world.

It is appreciated, of course, that opinions differ as to the extent and significance of these trends. Some will think these views do not appropriately weigh such counter trends as may exist. But national defense policies in the nuclear age should be formulated conservatively, based on the most realistic assessment of potential enemy capabilities.³ It is imprudent, indeed even reckless, to formulate such policies on the

³ It should be remembered here that in recent years intelligence projections frequently have understated these capabilities. Laird Report, *supra*, pp. 34, 101.

basis of subjective judgments as to Soviet and Red Chinese intentions rather than their known military and technological capabilities.⁴

Where the issues are the security of our country, the preservation of the values of a free society, and possibly the life or death of tens of millions of our people, responsible government cannot afford to run the risk of miscalculation on the optimistic side. The lessons of history abundantly teach that nations do not survive by trusting other nations to be rational or by setting examples of unilateral restraint in self defense.

THE GENERAL WORLD POSTURE

Genuine peace, the professed goal of all mankind, is as remote today as at any time since World War II.

The Asian Continent

On the Asian continent, the war in Southeast Asia drags on. Communist aggression continues in South Vietnam and Laos, and now threatens the national existence of Cambodia. With Red China building a military road across northern Laos directed toward Thailand, apprehension mounts in that ancient kingdom.

North Korea, reckless and arrogant, attacked an American ship and plane with impunity and constitutes a threat so serious that some 60,000 American troops remain in South Korea 17 years after the tenuous armistice there.⁵

Despite internal convulsions, Red China maintains the world's largest ground forces and is acquiring a significant nuclear capability. Its despotic regime harbors and promotes the most virulent hatred of America.⁶ Its ambitions within Asia—beyond Taiwan—remain ob-

⁴ The folly of relying on assumptions as to intentions, rather than upon known capabilities, is documented by countless military surprises down through history. Pearl Harbor is a classic example. More recent examples involving the Soviet Union include the Cuban Missile Crisis and Czechoslovakia. See Senator Henry M. Jackson, Senate Speech, July 9, 1969.

⁵ Plans to withdraw 20,000 American troops are opposed by the South Korean government. As indicated in a recent on the scene report "there is no real peace in Korea today." N.Y. Times, article by Philip Shabecoff, June 24, 1970.

⁶ Mao Tse-tung recently issued a fresh indictment against the U.S., calling for a "protracted peoples' war" against American "imperialism," and concluding: "People of the world, unite and defeat the U.S. aggressors and all of their running dogs!", N.Y. Times, May 21, 1970.

secure, although already it has conquered Tibet, conducted border incursions against India, and indicated a continuing covetousness toward Southeast Asia.

Some think the greatest threat to peace in Asia lies along the Soviet-Chinese border where ancient hostilities have been exacerbated. However this may be, Asia is a continent of discord and unrest with military strength mounting in the four Communist powers. There is no peace or prospect of it.

The Middle East

The situation in the Middle East, in terms of possible escalation into major confrontation, appears to be even more serious. A state of undeclared but active war existed between Israel and its Arab neighbors until the August 1970 cease fire. Although the Arab states have an implacable hatred of Israel they are incapable of waging modern war without the weapons, technicians and economic support provided by the Soviet Union.

The strategic significance of the Middle East is profound. The petroleum resources there are vital to the economic well being of much of the Free World. Effective control of these resources—at least to the extent of being able to deny them to the Free World—is an obvious Soviet strategic objective. Perhaps a less obvious objective is the re-opening and control of the Suez Canal. This waterway, as important to the Soviet Union as the Panama Canal has been to the U.S., would provide the cheapest and most effective transportation route between the Soviet heartland in Europe and the Soviet far east. The critical importance of this sea link is evident in relation to a possible U.S.S.R. confrontation with Red China.⁷ These strategic considerations explain the willingness of the Soviet Union to incur the gravest risks of escalation. In addition to building up United Arab Republic and Syrian capabilities, the Soviet Union has deployed in the UAR some 100 Mig 21-J's and a substantial number of SAM-3 sites, all operated by Soviet personnel.⁸

⁷ The Suez Canal has other strategic significance. The Soviet Union continues to supply North Vietnam by sea. Soviet ships from Black Sea ports now require nearly 40 days to reach Vietnam by sailing around Africa.

⁸ See *The Military Balance 1970-71*, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 45.

The cease-fire plan appeared initially to afford an opportunity for negotiations. But this hope was dashed, perhaps irretrievably, by Soviet and UAR duplicity in deploying SAM's within the agreed truce zones.⁹

In view of Israeli-Arab hostility and Soviet ambitions in the Middle East, including its desire to out-flank NATO in the Mediterranean, there is no prospect of genuine peace in this explosive area.

Western Europe

The situation in Western Europe, the area of our most vital interest, remains relatively precarious beneath the superficial aura of peace. The Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain still stand. NATO forces, including some 300,000 Americans, are confronted by a larger and better equipped Soviet force. This cold-war type confrontation, without precedent in history in terms of duration and scale, has lasted more than two decades with no end foreseeable.¹⁰ One has to visit Allied bases in West Germany to comprehend even dimly the tenseness and tragedy of hundreds of thousands of armed men facing each other night and day, with air crews alert, ground units in position, command posts staffed, and the flight of every aircraft monitored.

Berlin, that indefensible symbol of freedom which we nevertheless are committed to defend, remains surrounded by Communist forces which periodically block or harass access routes by land and air. Berlin has assumed crisis proportions a number of times in the past. No one can be sure that the future will be different.

Other Areas

The foregoing are the more visible and active danger areas in a troubled world, but ruptures of peace could come anywhere. A war was concluded in Africa earlier this year with heavy loss of life and infinite human suffering. There are few stable governments in either Africa or South America, where plots and revolutions and terroristic activities are commonplace. Cuba, now an armed and erratic Com-

⁹ See editorial comment, *The New York Times*, September 20, 1970. The Soviet Union also shared responsibility for Syria's brief but dangerous intervention in Jordan's September 1970 civil war.

¹⁰ The recent Soviet-West German nonaggression pact may result in some surface lessening of tension, but as long as Soviet ground, air and missile forces are maintained in Eastern Europe, with the capability of overrunning and destroying Western Europe, there can be no assurance of peace and freedom.

munist power, is a major base for subversion, the export of revolution, and possibly for Soviet naval operations.

Communists Have Common Objective

It is true that the solidarity of the international Communist movement has been fractured. The friendship between the Soviet Union and Red China has dissolved. Even the boasted unity of the Warsaw Pact members depends nakedly upon the military might of the Soviet Union and its openly avowed "right" to employ this might against any recalcitrant member.¹¹

But this disunity among Communist powers does not necessarily enhance the chances of peace for the Free World. The hate propaganda of both the Soviet Union and Red China against the United States exceeds that leveled against each other. Each has always proclaimed that the principal enemy is "imperialistic America." The Marxist dream of unity among Communist countries may have faded, but the Marxist purpose of communizing the world remains the goal of every Communist party.

This, in briefest summary, is the disordered state of the world at the beginning of the 1970's. Rational persons, familiar with the lessons of history, would hardly choose this time to undermine our own military forces either by irresponsible criticism or unilateral reductions in defense capabilities.

World Order Maintained by U.S.

Since World War II a degree of world order has been maintained almost solely by the dominance of U.S. strategic military strength. But for this strength and our will to assert it to preserve freedom, few doubt that the Soviet Union would have imposed Communist regimes on a number of other countries. It had the ambition to subjugate Greece and much of Western Europe just as it did the Eastern European satellites. But for American military strength there also would

¹¹ The Brezhnev doctrine, announced as justification of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. In commenting on this proclaimed right of aggression, the New York Times said: "This reliance on force and contempt for law must raise fears that some day Moscow will decide that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of non-Communist nations is also being interpreted" in a way which justifies Soviet intervention. New York Times editorial, Sept. 28, 1968.

have been Communist incursions and aggressions—beyond those we have experienced—in Asia, Africa and even in this hemisphere.¹²

This world order which we have attempted to preserve has been precarious and far from effective in many instances. But at least the principal objectives have been attained. The freedom and independence of Western Europe and the opportunity of the countries there to restructure themselves economically were assured. Many nations around the world, including the emerging new nations in Africa, were encouraged to pursue courses of nonalignment. The prospect of worldwide Communist domination—a likely one in the absence of American deterrence—was not a realizable goal. But most important of all, a fragile peace was preserved between the great powers and there was no employment of nuclear weapons.

A New Era—Communist World Order?

This American preserved world order is now disintegrating. We no longer have the power to preserve it. Nor do we appear to have the will, as a new neo-isolationist fever dims the perception of our people. The Communists everywhere applaud this end of an era, and even many in our country seem to welcome it.¹³

Whatever one's views on this point may be, the critical question now is what sort of world order will exist in the years ahead. There is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union envisions the new era as one which it will dominate, employing its military power and the threat of its use to promote and attain its own imperialistic objectives.

Second Best in a Troubled World

Thus, as we enter the 1970's America is confronted with an inherently unstable world situation in which "little wars and revolutions" can escalate and major wars develop on short notice. We face a world in which the military balance of power is shifting from the West

¹² Only U.S. superior military strength frustrated the Soviet plan to install strategic missiles in Cuba, although history may record that U.S. concessions assured an unmolested Communist regime and base in Cuba.

¹³ C. L. Sulzberger, foreign correspondent of The New York Times, recently commented on the "neo-isolationism" in this country, and noted that "U.S. influence is being slowly squeezed out" of Western Europe, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. New York Times Service, Richmond Times-Dispatch, July 24, 1970.

to the East, and the world order sustained by dominant American power is fading away. In the most optimistic view, a precarious order will continue as the two superpowers maintain an uncertain balance of deterrence. A less optimistic view, and one supported by the weight of the evidence, is that the United States will become a "second rate" power subordinate to manifest Soviet military superiority. In that case, the world order of the future will bear a Soviet trademark, with all peoples upon whom it is imprinted suffering Communist repressions.¹⁴

THE END OF U.S. MILITARY SUPERIORITY

The facts set forth in the Reports of the President and the Secretary of Defense, mentioned above, clearly foreshadow the end of U.S. military superiority.¹⁵ This was predetermined by decisions made in the 1960's, which resulted in the reduction, postponement and abandonment of strategic defense measures and weapons systems. These decisions reflected the budgetary priorities of the Vietnamese war as well as a desire to de-escalate the strategic arms race by an example of self-imposed restraint.

In any event, the U.S. is now face-to-face with the fruits of this unilateral strategic arms slowdown.

Soviet Missile Superiority

The Soviet Union has attained for the first time a superior strategic capability—where it counts the most—in ICBM's. The U.S. froze its ICBM's at 1,054 in the mid-60's when the Soviets had less than 250 ICBM's. While we imposed a limitation on additional strategic weapons, the Soviets pressed forward to overtake and pass us. Intelligence estimates indicate that they now have over 1,250 operational ICBM's, and will have about 1,300 by the end of 1970.¹⁶

¹⁴ This paper addresses primarily the Soviet threat which is clearly paramount for the 1970's. There is no thought of minimizing the threat of Red China, the leadership of which is so implacably hostile to the U.S. and to a lesser extent the Soviet Union. It is possible that in the long run Red China is more likely to rupture peace than any other nation.

¹⁵ See also Mr. Laird's address of April 20, 1970, at the Annual Luncheon of the Associated Press, N.Y. Times, April 21, 1970; and data reported in *The Military Balance 1970-1971*, published by The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1970.

¹⁶ President's Report, p. 120 and Secretary Laird's Report, p. 35. See *The Military Balance, supra*, p. 6, which reports about 1300 operational ICBM's in

More than 275 of the operational Soviet ICBM's are SS-9's, each capable of delivering 25 megatons as compared to the one megaton payload of the U.S. Minuteman missile.¹⁷ The major portion of the remainder of the Soviet ICBM's are SS-11's and SS-13's, each capable of a payload as large as that of Minuteman.¹⁸

More serious than the numerical superiority is the substantial megatonnage advantage enjoyed by the Soviet Union. The enormous payloads of the SS-9's have a destructive capacity incomparably greater than any U.S. missile; they have a wider margin of error; they are effective against hardened missile silos as well as population and industrial centers; and their launch vehicle is capable of far more extensive MIRV systems than any U.S. missile.

Although the U.S. has frozen the number of its ICBM's at 1,054, we have commenced to deploy Minuteman III with MIRV warheads. This is a significant qualitative advance in missile technology. The Soviets are believed already to have deployed MRV's in some SS-9's,¹⁹ and they have recently tested what appears to be a MIRV system for the SS-11 missile, indicating an early capability comparable to Minuteman III.²⁰

The qualitative lead of the U.S. in MIRV's and guidance systems may prove to be short lived in view of Soviet success and the scale of its effort. The Soviet Union's advantage in numbers and megatonnage

July 1970. Intelligence estimates of the number of ICBM's actually deployed are extremely accurate. But estimates of production rates (and hence future operational strength) have consistently erred on the low side. See Laird Report, p. 34.

¹⁷ Secretary Laird's Report, p. 35. The Soviets are continuing to produce SS-9's at a rate of about 50 per year, and will have some 300 by the end of this year. See Laird, Address of April 20, 1970, *supra*. The Institute for Strategic Studies, based in London, publishes annually *The Military Balance* (cited *supra*) and a complementary publication entitled *The Strategic Survey*. Although there are variations in detail as to types and numbers of weapons, the data published by The Institute for Strategic Studies generally corroborates the unclassified information of the U.S. Defense Department.

¹⁸ See *The Military Balance*, *supra*, p. 6, which credits the Soviet Union with 800 SS-11's, with deployment continuing.

¹⁹ The distinction between MRV and MIRV is that in the former the multiple separate warheads are not independently guided to targets.

²⁰ Secretary Laird estimated last February that if the Soviets follow a "High Force-High Technology" approach they will probably have their first "MIRV's by mid-1971 and a very formidable hard target kill capability (by MIRV's) by the mid-1970's." Laird Report, p. 104. The recent Pacific testing of multiple reentry vehicles on improved SS-11 missiles indicates the Soviets are significantly ahead of this schedule.

of missiles also seems certain to increase, as it continues to construct and deploy ICBM's at a rate that could result in a force more than double that of the U.S. by the Mid-70's.²¹ At that level of superiority, the Soviet Union would have the capability of effectively destroying both the U.S. ICBM and bomber forces as well as our cities.²²

Polaris—A Vital But Limited Response

The U.S. is fortunate to have its Polaris force, consisting of 41 atomic powered submarines capable of launching a total of 656 missiles (SLBM's). As in the case of ICBM's, we froze the number of Polaris submarines in the mid-60's and no new ones are authorized.

We have commenced the conversion from Polaris to the Poseidon configuration, increasing the size and range of the SLBM warheads. The Defense Department projects the ultimate conversion of 31 submarines, although only eight have been authorized by the Congress.

The U.S. superiority in this category of strategic weapons is also being challenged. The Soviet Union is now engaged in a priority construction program for its Y-class atomic powered submarine which is superior in some respects to Polaris. Ten of these submarines are believed to be operational, each with 16 SLBM's, and the Soviet Union is producing as many as eight to ten new vessels per year in two shipyards. By 1974-75, if this program continues, the Soviet Union will have some 50 Y-class subs with a missile capability greater than our present Polaris force.

Y-class submarines are already patrolling the U.S. coast. Their deployment constitutes an ever-present threat to the survivability of our national command headquarters, to most of our major cities, and increasingly to the bomber element of our deterrent.²³

²¹ See Laird Report, p. 103. Secretary Laird recognized that this cannot be a firm estimate at this time.

²² See Dr. John S. Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Statement before Subcommittee of House Armed Services Committee, March 9, 1970, p. 9 *et seq.*; Laird Report, pp. 48, 49, 103, 104. See also The Strategic Survey of 1969, *supra*, pp. 30, 31 where the "new and more accurate guidance systems" are discussed, and the conclusion reached: "The whole future of land-based ICBM's has been called into question (by this improved accuracy), since it begins to seem possible that no amount of protection for ICBM silos can compensate for the improvements in accuracy now in prospect." This judgment by The Strategic Survey applies primarily to the vulnerability of U.S. missiles.

²³ See Secretary Laird's Report, pp. 39, 40 and 50.

Balancing the two SLBM forces against each other is not meaningful without considering the relationship of other strategic weapons systems and their survivability following a preemptive strike. If, as indicated above, the Soviet ICBM force attains the capability of destroying or neutralizing our ICBM and bomber forces, the only remaining retaliatory strategic weapon system would be Polaris.

But is it prudent, by tolerating an increasing Soviet ICBM superiority together with a rapidly expanding SLBM capability, to risk the security of the U.S. on a single retaliatory system which we do not plan to enlarge (except qualitatively) and which has definite limitations? Of our 41 Polaris submarines, a significant number are always in port and nonoperational. This means that at any given time our Polaris "assured retaliation" is considerably less than the specified total capability. Soviet strategists may conclude, as their ABM system is extended and improved, that—following a massive preemptive first strike—the damage potential of our SLBM response would be an acceptable risk.

Moreover, there can be no assurance that the presently assumed invulnerability of Polaris will continue.²⁴ As the Senate Armed Services Committee has said: "We cannot assume that our Polaris system will be the first weapon in history to remain invulnerable."

Strategic Bombers

The third element of the U.S. strategic force consists of about 550 B-52 bombers, as compared with some 200 Soviet strategic bombers. Although a vital weapons system for many years, the subsonic and obsolescing B-52's are approaching the end of their effectiveness as a major strategic system. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union are gradually minimizing their reliance upon existing strategic bombers. In assessing the strategic balance of power for the 70's, one must discount the role and significance of these aircraft.²⁵

²⁴ A technological breakthrough in the underwater detection and tracking of submarines could give the first nation to achieve it a decisive advantage. See Interview with Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., *Air Force/Space Digest*, July 1970, pp. 31, 35. It has been suggested that such a technological breakthrough may be achieved by "sensing devices that could reveal every submarine in the oceans to detection." See news report on a Pre-Pugwash Conference on New Technology and the Arms Race, Racine, Wisconsin. *The Washington Post*, Sept. 9, 1970, p. A-3.

²⁵ The U.S. has plans for a test model of a new supersonic bomber (B-1). A force of such bombers capable of long distance air-to-ground launches would add

The Misleading "Numbers Game"

There is a pervasive public misunderstanding as to the comparative strategic capabilities of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This may well result in major part from the widespread practice—among some of the media and among others who minimize the need for national defense measures—of treating nuclear warheads as if they were fungible. This has sometimes been referred to as the "numbers game," namely, the mere counting of warheads without analysis of megatonnage, range, accuracy, survivability and reliability of delivery.

The typical presentation of comparative strength simply totals "the number of warheads deliverable by the U.S. and Soviet strategic systems." An example, which made first-page news, was a tabulation taken from The Strategic Survey showing the U.S. capable of delivering 4,235 nuclear warheads as against only 1,880 by the Soviet Union.²⁶ The tabulation apparently added together all ICBM's, SLBM's and each warhead which U.S. and Soviet bombers are capable of carrying. Thus, a single bomb or one air-to-ground missile on a B-52 was equated with a Soviet 25-megaton ICBM.²⁷ This simplistic type of comparison creates the illusion of abundant security, if not U.S. over-kill capability.

It would be difficult to conceive of a better way to mislead the public than to present—without precise definition and analysis—comparative figures of this kind. Those who present such distortions contribute to the confusion rather than enlightenment of our people.

If one wished to make a dramatic comparison indicating precisely the opposite result, the basis could be deliverable megatonnage rather than numbers of warheads. The 300 Soviet SS-9's, expected to be operational by the end of this year, will be capable of delivering

flexibility and diversity to our deterrent capability, and also would be useful in limited, non-nuclear confrontations. Such bombers must be designed, however, to operate from numerous smaller and dispersed airfields to minimize vulnerability from ICBM's and SLBM's.

²⁶ The Strategic Survey of 1969, *supra*, p. 28. It is not suggested that the Survey itself was misleading. The tabulation which received the wide press publicity was *only one* of many tables in the Survey, which also included a great deal of relevant data on megatonnage, accuracy and survivability.

²⁷ Of the total warheads assigned to the U.S. 1,853 represent the optimum load of our B-52 force, while 450 were assigned to Soviet strategic bombers. A similar distortion of SLBM's apparently was included in the tabulation, assigning 1,328 warheads to Polaris submarines.

7,500 megatons with a destructive capability several times greater than the total warhead capacity of our entire ICBM and SLBM forces. While such a comparison would be far more meaningful than the "numbers game," it also would be an oversimplified presentation of vastly complex relationships and components of strategic military power.

Other Weapons Systems

There are, of course, aircraft carriers and other tactical means (by fighter bomber aircraft and short-range missiles) of delivering nuclear warheads. This is not the place to discuss or balance these out in detail.²⁸ But analysis of the comparative numbers, types and probable employability of these weapons in a time of national or international peril is not reassuring.

The available tactical means of delivery do significantly augment the U.S. strategic forces. It must be remembered, however, that the Soviet and Warsaw Pact tactical forces deployed against NATO possess overall capabilities superior to those of NATO.²⁹

This tactical superiority is fortified by the rarely mentioned Soviet intermediate range ballistic missile force (IRBM), a type of weapons system we no longer possess. The Soviet Union has deployed more than 700 IRBM's targeted against Allied and U.S. military forces and the cities of Western Europe. Following a preemptive first strike, with these and shorter range missiles, there would be little American or Allied retaliatory capability remaining there. Indeed, in view of the threat of certain destruction of much of Western Europe posed by Soviet IRBM's, one may question whether NATO would be willing to employ tactical nuclear weapons even against a Soviet attempt to overrun Western Europe with conventional forces.

²⁸ This Statement addresses broadly the strategic balance of power and does not discuss comparative tactical or general force capabilities. Secretary Laird's Report, and especially the appendices, indicate the superiority of the Communist powers in non-nuclear military power. See also the publications of The Institute of Strategic Studies, *supra*.

²⁹ Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, has warned that "the balance of security there is shifting in favor of the Soviet bloc." He stated that the Warsaw Pact forces "form a concentration of military power that exceeds anything the world has previously seen. These Soviet forces far exceed anything that is required solely for defense." Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 16, 1970.

In short, if the U.S. no longer possesses the strategic superiority which has been the ultimate "shield" protecting the European democracies, the tactical imbalance against the West could result in profound new military and political problems.

A Soviet First-Strike Capability

Our planners in the 60's assumed that if both super-powers had an adequate survivable retaliatory capability neither would risk a first strike. They further assumed that the Soviet leadership would be content with this "balance of deterrence," especially if—by freezing our own program—we permitted the Soviet Union to attain a rough parity of strength. Little consideration appears to have been given to the possibility that the Soviets would not "buy" such a rational program, but rather would seek a capability to neutralize the effectiveness of our retaliatory response.

It now appears that the Soviet Union is developing just such a capability. It is producing and deploying offensive nuclear weapons with the capability, when sufficient are deployed, to destroy the ICBM and bomber elements of our retaliatory forces. At the same time, the Soviet Union is pressing ahead with an anti-ballistic missile system designed to provide a strategic defense against such U.S. retaliatory missiles as might survive a first strike.

It is to be remembered that, with the possible exception of our obsolete B-52 force, our strategic weapons are designed primarily for retaliation against enemy centers of population. They are not designed as counter-force weapons and with their limited warheads are not an effective weapon for destroying Soviet ICBM's in hardened silos. This is in accord with America's irreversible commitment never to make a first strike, and to rely—as a deterrent—on having enough operational missiles *after* an enemy strike to destroy its population centers.

This entire theory becomes untenable if the enemy develops (i) an offensive first-strike capability against our means of delivering retaliatory missiles and (ii) a defensive capability of protecting much of its heartland from such U.S. missiles (e.g. Polaris) as survive the preemptive strike.

The evidence is reasonably conclusive that the Soviet Union is planning precisely these capabilities. This is not to say that a pre-

emptive first strike is intended, but rather that weapons systems which are needed *only* for such a purpose are being deployed:

SS-9 missiles. These missiles, with 25-megaton warheads capable of destroying American ICBM's in hardened silos, are designed as a counter-force, preemptive strike weapon. Warheads of this size are not needed for retaliation against even the largest city. The Soviets are continuing to produce and deploy these monster missiles.

SS-9 with MRV. This multiple reentry vehicle contains a cluster of three warheads each, capable of delivering five megatons. Our MIRV warheads for Minuteman III are 'pigmies' by comparison, delivering only 200 kilotons, and are designed—not as counter-force weapons—but to penetrate ABM defenses of enemy cities.⁸⁰

SS-11's buildup. The Soviets also are continuing to produce and deploy SS-11's, despite having attained missile superiority over the static U.S. force. They have now tested what appears to be a MIRV system for their SS-11's, which—when deployed—will escalate the ratio of superiority.

Soviet ABM deployment. The Soviet Union is committing large resources to strategic defense systems, both against missiles and bombers.⁸¹ The Moscow population and industrial area are already protected by the Galosh system, with 67 launchers for multi-stage missiles with megaton warheads.⁸² The Soviets are also deploying at about half-a-dozen points around the Soviet Union giant "Henhouse" radars for ballistic missile defense acquisition and tracking. As the radar installation is the long lead time component, it is possible that the Soviets are extending their Galosh ABM system to protect many other areas. They are some five years ahead of the United States in

⁸⁰ William Beecher, writing in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1969, assumes a 100 kiloton warhead on our MIRV, and states that the Soviet MRV warhead is 50 times more powerful than our MIRV. The Strategic Survey for 1969, *supra*, p. 29, assumes a 200 kiloton warhead on MIRV's. See also Laird Report, p. 102, as to Soviet MIRV.

⁸¹ As a part of this protection, the USSR has deployed the most elaborate radar warning and counter-measure systems. It also has devoted a greater effort than the U.S. to advanced fighter interceptor aircraft (the Foxbat, for example) and to ground-to-air missiles, with larger defense forces in these categories than the U.S.

⁸² *The Military Balance 1970-71*, *supra*, p. 7.

this vital element of strategic power.³³ To the extent that Soviet cities and industrial areas are protected (while ours remain unprotected), the credibility of our retaliatory threat diminishes.

FOBS. The Soviets are developing a fractional orbital nuclear weapons system designed to minimize warning time.³⁴ This weapon is consistent with a first-strike strategy, as it virtually precludes the possibility of enough warning to fire our missiles or get our bombers off the ground.

Soviet SLBM's. The Y-class submarines described above will have the capability of eliminating most of our B-52 bomber force.³⁵ Also these SLBM's will constitute a grave threat to Washington, D. C., and to our national command centers.

It is clear from the foregoing and other evidence that the Soviets never have accepted the assumption upon which American strategic planning has been based. The structure of both their offensive and defensive forces strongly indicates that they have planned—and are moving to achieve—a first-strike capability of destroying our urban centers *and* neutralizing our retaliatory weapons except such Polaris submarines as happen to be on station.³⁶

In contemplating what risks responsible officials and members of Congress are willing to assume on behalf of the American people, it

³³ Although critics in this country doubt the feasibility of an ABM system, one must assume the Soviets would not be spending billions on such a system unless they had full confidence in its effectiveness. Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., and many qualified U.S. scientists, have no doubt that an effective ABM system is within the competency of existing technology. See interview with Dr. Foster, published in *Air Force/Space Digest*, July 1970, p. 31 *et seq.* See evidence marshalled by Sen. Henry M. Jackson in his ABM debate speeches to the Senate on Aug. 6 and 11, 1970. A major component of the ABM system, the Spartan missile, successfully intercepted an ICBM over the Pacific in a test on August 28, 1970.

³⁴ President Nixon's Report, *supra*, p. 125.

³⁵ Secretary Laird has stated that by the mid-70's the Soviets will probably have "a submarine force capable of destroying most of our alert bomber and tanker force before it can be airborne." Secretary Laird's Statement, pp. 50, 105. The Defense Department confirmed for the first time on April 23, 1970 that Y-class Soviet submarines, with 16 nuclear missiles are patrolling our Atlantic Seaboard. *N.Y. Times*, April 24, 1970. Secretary Laird reports that as of April 1970 the Soviets had over 200 operational launchers on nuclear submarines for submerged launch SLBM's, plus 70 launchers on diesel submarines. Laird's address, *supra* p. 11.

³⁶ Senator Jackson recently informed the Senate that "there is no doubt that their (the Soviet's) program, if continued, will produce a first-strike capability unless the U.S. takes appropriate counter measures." Senate Speech, Aug. 5, 1970.

is well to remember that we have no defense whatever against Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's which now have the capability of killing perhaps half of our population—more than 100 million people—by a surprise first strike.

Soviet "Blue Water" Navy

The weapons described above relate to the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear capability. The growing Soviet Navy is a threat of a different kind, and yet it confirms Soviet intentions to be the world's dominant military power.

For centuries, both under the Czars and more recently under Communist rule, Russia was a land power with limited capability at sea. Virtually landlocked, it was not a maritime power in a "blue water" sense. This has changed strikingly in recent years, as the Soviet Union has now achieved a challenging naval capability. It has the largest conventional submarine fleet; it is moving rapidly to overtake the U.S. in ballistic missile submarines; it has by far the strongest force of surface-to-surface missile-launching ships; and it leads the U.S. in numbers of cruisers, destroyer escorts and patrol boats. Only in aircraft carriers—presumably considered by the Soviets to be vulnerable to missile-launching vessels and aircraft—has the Soviet navy failed to challenge the U.S.

More important than numbers is the quality of the vessels. Although our carrier force is formidable indeed, the U.S. has failed to maintain a balanced navy of modern surface ships. The majority of our fleet vessels are more than 20 years old, many with obsolescing weapons and equipment. By contrast, most of the Soviet fleet is relatively new and modern,⁸⁷ often with vessels of greater speed, fire power and more advanced electronics than comparable vessels in the U.S. fleet.⁸⁸

The Soviet naval buildup, like its strategic missile deployment, is a major element in the shifting balance of military power. Although not

⁸⁷ The Soviets have been more innovative than the U.S., having pioneered in gas turbine propulsion, in developing a variety of surface-to-surface missile-launching ships, and possibly in new techniques of ASW.

⁸⁸ Nor have the Soviets neglected the support elements for world-wide naval operations. They have tankers, supply and maintenance vessels, supported by an impressive merchant marine fleet. They also have emphasized, more than any other nation, oceanographic studies and surveys. Their trawlers—used extensively for intelligence purposes—regularly patrol our coasts.

itself a direct threat to the continental United States (except the submarines), the new and growing Soviet naval strength affects adversely the diplomatic and economic position of the United States throughout much of the world. It also threatens an historic American policy, namely, freedom of the seas.

The U.S., traditionally a sea power, has extensive worldwide commitments. These range from the defense of U.S. states (Hawaii and Alaska), and its territories and bases, to the protection of American citizens and investments in scores of countries. These commitments also include treaty obligations to our allies, and the supplying of U.S. Armed Forces abroad. Our extensive international trade is essential to the continued prosperity of our people. U.S. commitments in all of these respects can be fulfilled only by maintaining control of the seas, now being increasingly challenged by Soviet naval power.

For some three centuries the British navy preserved freedom of the seas and fostered international trade. There were also other naval powers, including the U.S., Japan, Germany, France and Italy. All of this has changed beyond recognition in a dramatic shift of sea power. All of these navies (except that of the U.S.) have ceased to exist as blue water fleets. England has dismantled its great bases around the world, and the vacuum thus created is being filled by the Soviet Union. The Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean east of Malta are already dominated by Soviet naval power. There are no limits to the seas in which the Soviet navy now operates, as demonstrated by its naval maneuvers.⁸⁹

In the new era—in which a Soviet world order is envisioned by its Communist rulers—this navy will increasingly endanger the most vital diplomatic, military and economic interests of the U.S.

Retreat from the Threat

The situation which our country faces is without precedent. For a few years following World War II our national security was complete and unchallenged. In the early 50's the Soviet Union became a nuclear power and, with gradual but increasing momentum, it undertook to challenge American superiority. But we enjoyed marked ad-

⁸⁹ In April 1970 Soviet maneuvers, described by U.S. Navy spokesmen as the "biggest in history," involved some 200 warships. Associated Press story, April 23, 1970.

vantages in our industrial base, our technology, and in the sheer number and quality of strategic weapons. In the 60's our complacency in this respect became so great, and our preoccupation with the Vietnam war so distracting, that we neglected our strategic posture.

As a result, we enter the 70's confronted by (i) a superior Soviet offensive missile capability, (ii) a marked Soviet advantage in defensive missile capability, (iii) a menacing Soviet fleet, and (iv) with respect to all of these, a Soviet commitment and momentum which is quite unmatched in this country. We are also confronted, as Red China orbits its first satellite, with the certainty of a new and growing ICBM capability from that irrationally hostile nation.

Within a span of less than two decades we have moved from complete security to perilous insecurity.

Yet, the response of the public generally, much of the media and many political leaders ranges from apathy and complacency to affirmative hostility—not against the potential enemies which threaten us—but toward our own military establishment and the very concept of providing defense capabilities adequate to protect this country and its vital interests. The state of public opinion is such that some responsible leaders, fully familiar with the threat, believe it is futile to seek adequate defense funding. Thus, we respond as a nation—not by appropriate measures to strengthen our defenses, but by significant curtailments which widen the gap.

In short, the mood of the people and much of the Congress is almost one of precipitous retreat from the challenge. This paradox in response to possible national peril is without precedent in the history of this country.

THE CUTBACK IN DEFENSE SPENDING

It is in this mixed climate of euphoria and retreat that a major retrenchment in America's defense effort has been deemed necessary. The defense budget proposed for FY 1971, totaling \$71.8 billion in proposed expenditures, reflects the largest single cutback in defense spending since the Korean War.⁴⁰ Yet a significant portion of our political and intellectual leadership is demanding even more drastic reduction.

⁴⁰ Laird Report, *supra*, p. 21.

Difficult Budgetary Decisions

In addition to the public malaise, it must be recognized that the Administration and the Congress are confronted with extremely difficult budgetary decisions. The problems include (i) pressing and escalating domestic needs, (ii) inflationary costs, (iii) the continued drain of the Vietnamese war, and (iv) the imperative necessity of a budget more nearly in balance after years of deficits.

Quite apart from public and political pressures, there is an obvious need for some restructuring of national priorities as well as the effecting of all possible economies. The impact of all of these pressures centered on the defense budget, which the Secretary of Defense describes as a "bare bones" one. It is also recognized as "transitional," pending to some extent the outcome of the SALT talks and affording time for a more penetrating analysis by the new administration of defense needs, options and priorities.

Inadequate Funding

As understandable as the resulting budget may be, it entails the assumption of defense risks which seem unjustified.⁴¹ The \$71.8 billion dollars proposed for FY 1971 is \$9.8 billion below the Johnson administration budget proposal for FY 1970, and constitutes 7% of estimated gross national product—the lowest percentage since FY 1951. This proposed funding would constitute 34.6% of the total federal budget, the lowest commitment to defense since FY 1950.⁴²

Greater Soviet Effort

There has been no comparable restraint exercised by the Soviet Union either with respect to overall defense spending or the funding

⁴¹ Secretary Laird warned that in defense funding and in the deferral of decisions on vital defense measures "we are literally at the edge of prudent risk." Address of April 20, *supra*, p. 5.

⁴² Laird Report, *supra*, p. 22. The detailed facts and figures are set forth in the Reports of the President and the Secretary of Defense mentioned above. These include a comparison which indicates the neglect of strategic funding (after adjusting for inflation) since the beginning of the Vietnamese war. The FY 1971 defense funding is only \$3.8 billion, or 7% above the 1964 level of defense spending prior to the Vietnamese war. As the cost of that war has been running at more than \$25 billion per annum, it is evident that strategic spending—for the defense of the country—has been curtailed sharply.

of its strategic programs. On the contrary, the trend of Soviet defense spending continues steadily upward. Its total military funding about equals that of the U.S., although its gross national product (GNP) is barely half that of this country. If expenditures on the Vietnam war are excluded, the total Soviet effort substantially exceeds that of the U.S. But the mix of the spending is especially meaningful in view of its effect upon the strategic balance of power. The Soviet Union is spending significantly more than the U.S. in the buildup of its strategic offensive and defensive weapons.⁴³

The results of this greater Soviet effort are now reflected in their dramatic gains in ICBM's, SLBM's and other advanced weapons systems. If we continue to permit the Soviet Union to outdistance the U.S. in defense effort, it is inevitable that the security of this country will be endangered. As Secretary Laird has warned:

"Time and again in our past history our nation has paid a heavy price for allowing its armed forces to dwindle to levels that proved to be too low to discourage or to counter aggression."⁴⁴

In view of the crescendo of demands for further reductions in defense spending, we may be well along the road to reliving this past history.

THE THREAT TO TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY

There are three disturbing trends in defense funding: (i) the magnitude of the overall reduction, (ii) the unfavorable balance between Soviet spending on strategic forces as compared to our effort, and (iii) a similar unfavorable balance in the critical area of research and development (R&D). Of these, perhaps the last is the cause for greatest concern.

⁴³ It is difficult to know exactly what the Soviet Union is spending on defense. The statements above reflect estimates published by various sources. See Department of Defense Posture Statement, Jan. 15, 1969; Library of Congress studies; and Stanford Research Institute Studies. Mr. Laird has said that "the Soviet Union, as far as offensive strategic weapons systems, is outspending the U.S. in the ratio of three to two converted to dollars." Press conference, Feb. 18, 1969. See also address of Sen. Henry Jackson, U.S. Senate, Aug. 6, 1970.

⁴⁴ Laird Report, *supra*, p. 33.

Soviet Challenge to U.S. Technology

The U.S. has enjoyed a clear technological superiority over the Soviet Union and all other countries until recently. It has been this qualitative superiority, rather than the size of forces or numbers of weapons, which has enabled America to deter major war and protect the Free World during the past quarter of a century. This superiority is today being successfully challenged by the Soviet Union.⁴⁵

In addition to talented leadership and the necessary industrial base, the essential ingredients of a vital and competitive technology are skilled manpower and adequate R&D funding.⁴⁶ The U.S. is falling behind the Soviet Union in both of these respects.

More Graduate Engineers

As of 1969, the Soviet Union was believed to have about 550,000 full-time R&D scientists and engineers, as compared with about 540,000 in the U.S. But the Soviet Union is graduating annually a substantially greater number of engineers than the U.S., and its technically trained manpower base is projected steadily to outdistance that of the U.S.⁴⁷

Greater Funding of R&D

Comparative funding data for military-related R&D (including space/atomic energy) in the Soviet Union and the U.S. reflects a similar disparity. Soviet annual funding for this purpose is now estimated at about \$16 to \$17 billion as compared with U.S. funding of about \$13 to \$15 billion. Again, the trend is also adverse as the Soviet military R&D effort during the 1960's increased by about 60% while that of the U.S. increased 30%.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ Testimony of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, before a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 91st Congress, March 9, 1970. See also the Reports of the President and the Secretary of Defense, *supra*.

⁴⁶ Other essentials to the development and deployment of advanced weapons systems relate to procurement and defense planning, contracting and testing. These and related matters are discussed in the body of the Panel's Report.

⁴⁷ See Foster, *supra*, p. 28.

⁴⁸ See Foster, *supra*, p. 30 *et seq.* Dr. Foster points out that total R&D spending, both civilian and military, is still greater in the United States, but the trend is unfavorable even with the addition of our non-military-related effort.

Secretary Laird has pointed out that "the Soviet Union is devoting more effort to military-related R&D than is the U.S.," with its rate of such expenditures increasing "about 10-13% annually" while comparable U.S. expenditures "remain relatively constant."⁴⁹

Threat to Minuteman

In relating our need for the most advanced technology to the Soviet threat, Dr. Foster has testified that by early 1974 the Soviet Union, if it continues its ICBM production and deployment, will be able "completely to overwhelm the present Minuteman portion of our deterrent."⁵⁰ He stated that the Safeguard program (ABM) should improve the survivability of a significant fraction of the U.S. land-based missiles. But the long-range survivability of an adequate number of our ICBM's cannot be assured without a more extensive and effective ABM system than has been proposed. The critical necessity of providing alternative measures is now a priority task of R&D.⁵¹ Dr. Foster cited this problem as one example of the frightening way in which advancing technology obsolesces both offensive and defensive weapons and even entire weapons systems. Indeed, he states a "major restructuring of our strategic forces may be necessary to insure survivability."⁵²

Lead Time—A Free Society Handicap

The problem of "lead time" in weapons development is particularly acute in competition between an open and a closed society. The time span between initial R&D and deployment may range from five to fifteen years, depending upon complexity and rapidity of new developments requiring changes or redesigning. In a Communist state, where secrecy is both an obsession and a way of life, the development of a

⁴⁹ See Laird's Report, *supra*, p. 66.

⁵⁰ Foster, *supra*, pp. 9, 10.

⁵¹ Alternative systems under consideration include (i) the mobile basing of Minuteman-type missiles, and (ii) an undersea long-range missile system (ULMS's) with submarines capable of launching missiles of ICBM range. Dr. Foster, *supra*, p. 12. Secretary Laird's Statement, pp. 48, 49. The Soviets may already be well ahead of the U.S. in developing a mobile ICBM. The Strategic Survey for 1969, *supra*, at p. 29, states: "A mobile ICBM has certainly been under development for some time, and the Soviet Union has claimed that it is already operational."

⁵² Foster, *supra*, p. 14; Laird Report, *supra*, p. 49.

new weapon may be concealed—even from our most intensive intelligence efforts—until testing begins or often until the completed weapon is displayed in Red Square. This gives the Soviet Union and Red China at least a five-year time advantage in developing new weapons systems. If a major technological breakthrough should catch us by surprise the results could be catastrophic.⁵³

Hope of Survival—Technological Superiority

There is no way completely to guard against the possibility of some dramatic and concealed technological advance in weaponry. But this risk is minimized directly in proportion to the extent we maintain an overall superior technological base and a more effective R&D effort than any other nation.

It is precisely here that recent trends create serious doubts as to the future security of this country. The United States can never match its potential enemies in land armies or in numbers of tactical weapons. Our only hope of survival is to maintain clear weapons superiority. This simply cannot be achieved by permitting our industrial and technological manpower bases to erode and by inadequate emphasis on R&D.

No subject in the entire spectrum of defense problems deserves a higher priority of thoughtful and urgent attention.⁵⁴

NEGOTIATIONS—TRAP OR OPPORTUNITY

One of the reasons assigned for the “transitional” budget proposed for FY 1971 is the hope that the present Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will be fruitful. Some political leaders have urged even greater restraint than that reflected in the reduced budget, arguing—despite all experience to the contrary—that the Soviets might be influenced favorably by our example.

⁵³ Science and Technology, Tools for Progress, report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy, April 1970, p. 38: “Technology will not stand still; on the contrary it will likely move more rapidly. The penalty for technological surprise can be enormous.”

⁵⁴ Other problems related to technology and R&D have been identified in the main body of the Panel's Report.

The Object of SALT

There are obvious reasons for seeking to halt the escalation of nuclear weapons. The logic of the situation—at least on the surface—calls for a “freeze,” which seems such a facile and popular solution. In simplest terms, the object of SALT is to agree upon a limitation—and perhaps a gradual reduction—of strategic nuclear weapons. An effective agreement to this end which does not leave either side at the mercy of the other, which does not in itself alter the balance of power, and with procedures to assure compliance, would be welcomed by most of the world. SALT therefore deserves the most careful attention, as all avenues toward a more peaceful world must be explored.

Disarmament Talks—Record of Failure

But whatever the hopes and opportunities of SALT may be, there is no precedent in history of effective disarmament being accomplished by agreement between major powers with divergent national interests. Nor has U.S. experience been reassuring. There is nothing new about our seeking disarmament through negotiation. This has been the most consistent element in American foreign policy since the beginning of the nuclear age. Few seem now to remember the U.S. offer to prevent an atomic arms race by delivering its stockpile to the United Nations—an offer rejected by the USSR. Periodically since then various efforts to slow or halt the arms race by negotiation have been frustrated in every instance by the intransigency of the Soviet Union.

It is true that three negotiations have been successful in the sense that limited agreements were reached on important issues. Yet none of these agreements has slowed the pace of the Soviet armaments or its manifest quest for superiority. Indeed, we may have magnified and perhaps even misconstrued the significance of such agreements.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The first of these, the Test Ban Treaty of 1963, halted nuclear testing in the atmosphere. The Soviets only agreed to this at a time when their test program, involving high-yield weapons with both offensive and defensive (ABM) capabilities, was well ahead of America's. We had previously been duped during the late 50's into the cessation of testing similar weapons on the specious theory that the Soviets might follow a good example. The second agreement was the United Nations' ban on the use of outer space for military purposes, an agreement which the Soviet Union appears already to have violated in spirit. The third of these limited agreements is the Nonproliferation Treaty, recently approved, which leaves a number of non-signing nations free to develop nuclear weapons.

Communist Concept of Negotiation

All Americans would like to think—despite the absence of convincing evidence—that the Cold War is over and that we have indeed entered a new era of negotiation. Our desire for peace is so strong and our national inclination to assume reciprocal friendliness and rationality so genuine, there is danger that we may assume without justification a similar spirit on the part of the Soviet leaders.⁵⁶

But it is prudent to remember that the Communist concept of negotiation is radically different from ours. They view it as a component of conflict, with the objective of gaining an advantage without conceding anything. The classic description of the Soviet approach is as follows:

“Soviet officials do not converse with foreigners: they compete. There is no searching for understanding in conversation as we understand it in the West, no effort at accommodation of the mind, not even the slightest hint or suggestion that the Soviet Union has ever done anything that was in anyway wrong or even unwise, imprudent or intolerable. Their idea of give and take in a talk is simple: You give, they take.”⁵⁷

Few American diplomats have had greater experience in attempting to negotiate with Communists than Dean Acheson. Writing his autobiography with the sober perspective of time, he said:

“What one must learn (from our experiences) is that the Soviet authorities are not moved to agreement by negotiation—that is, by a series of mutual concessions calculated to move parties desiring an agreement closer to an acceptable one.”⁵⁸

Humiliation and Futility

The dreary and frustrating record of negotiating with Communists abundantly documents the foregoing views.⁵⁹ One need not go back to the disillusionments of Yalta and Potsdam, to the exasperating ne-

⁵⁶ One may recall the disillusionment after the hopes engendered by the “spirit of Geneva” and “the spirit of Camp David” were dashed by Soviet duplicity.

⁵⁷ James Reston, *New York Times*, Dec. 8, 1960, p. 46.

⁵⁸ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, W. W. Norton & Co., N.Y., 1969, p. 729.

⁵⁹ Past negotiations have occurred when the overwhelming weight of bargaining power lay on our side of the table. Now, when the U.S. is relatively weaker, and when the issue is the future security of our country, it is prudent to be skeptical as to the genuine mutuality of any agreement acceptable to the Soviet Union.

gotiations over Berlin, or to the recurrent disarmament talks which have foundered on the Soviet determination to take all and give nothing. The past failures are legion and recent experience affords little basis to expect anything different. Seventeen years of humiliating effort have failed to produce a negotiated settlement of the Korean War, and the mockery in Paris has now continued for nearly two and one-half years. It will be said that the Soviet Union has not been a direct party to the Panmunjon and Paris talks. Yet no one familiar with the realities of world power and politics doubts that the Soviets could make these discussions meaningful whenever they so desire.⁶⁰ Rather, they continue to support the aggression in Southeast Asia and the threat of aggression in Korea, while the "peace" talks are exploited for Communist propaganda.

The most recent example of the unwisdom of relying upon USSR assurances is its role in sabotaging the Middle East cease fire by supporting, if not participating in, the violation thereof by the UAR.⁶¹

Trap for the Unwary?

This is the historical framework in which all negotiations with Communist powers should be viewed. We must continue to hope and to strive for a genuine change of attitude and for some constructive results. In the nuclear age, every opportunity to negotiate and to improve channels of communications must be pursued. But there is always the danger of fatal concessions or even of a deliberate trap.

The Soviet Union has been an unpredictable and aggressive power, certainly for the past 30 years.⁶² It has acted with stealth, surprise and ruthlessness—when it attacked Poland in concert with Nazi Germany; when it subjugated its allies, Hungary and Czechoslovakia; and when it moved to deploy missiles in Cuba.

⁶⁰ The competition between the Soviet Union and Red China for dominant influence in smaller Communist countries does complicate the situation, making it less likely that either will take the lead in exercising an ameliorating influence.

⁶¹ Although the full extent of Soviet participation in this violation may not yet be known, press reports and commentators indicate that "the Kremlin broke its word, lied to the United States and double crossed the developing peace." See, for example, Roscoe and Geoffrey Drummond, *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, Sept. 10, 1970; Joseph Alsop, *The Washington Post*, Sept. 21, 1970; and Evans and Novak, *The Washington Post*, Sept. 21, 1970.

⁶² In addressing the Senate on July 9, 1969, Sen. Henry M. Jackson said that "an increasing number of informed western analysts assess the Soviet Union (today) as a dangerous and unpredictable opponent."

The Soviet Union has been making a massive effort, out of all proportion to its own resources or any external threat, to acquire and extend strategic nuclear superiority over the U.S. Its record of feverish military preparation is unequaled since Hitler—determined upon conquest—structured his Wehrmacht for World War II. The Soviet Union has shown an almost paranoiac hostility toward America and “capitalist imperialism,” as evidenced by its consistently hostile conduct in every arena of international affairs and by its pervasive anti-American propaganda for a quarter of a century.

Only the reckless or the naive would negotiate with such an adversary except with the greatest caution and skepticism. Likewise, we would indeed risk the security of our country if defense planning and funding are predicated on assumptions or hopes as to the willingness of the Soviet Union to agree to mutually fair and enforceable disarmament.

As President Nixon well said, “we cannot trust our future to the self restraint of countries that have not hesitated to use their power even against their allies.”⁶³

Strategic Implications of a “Freeze”

It is possible that the Soviet Union sees SALT as an opportunity to assure indefinitely for itself, by agreement, a position of military superiority. This would be accomplished if we were foolhardy enough to agree to an arms limitation which left the U.S. vulnerable to a Soviet first-strike capability or which otherwise undermines the credibility of our capacity effectively to retaliate. But one may assume that U.S. negotiators will not commit such egregious folly.

There may be a less visible danger. The Soviet Union could strengthen its overall military and political position by an agreement which freezes strategic capabilities at some level of specified parity. Even if it be assumed that the result would be genuine strategic parity⁶⁴—rather than the freezing of the present Soviet advantages—the consequences could still be profound in terms of total military power and diplomatic influence.

⁶³ The President's Report, p. 111.

⁶⁴ “Parity” is inherently a theoretical—not a realistic—concept, as there are too many variables both as to the quality and characteristics of various weapons and the circumstances under which they might be employed.

The Soviet Union is appreciably stronger than the U.S. in tactical forces and weapons. Moreover, the Soviet Union has some 700 IRBM's deployed within convenient range of defenseless Western European cities and NATO forces. The Soviet tactical forces—capable of overrunning much of the land mass of Europe, Asia and Asia Minor—have been restrained for the past quarter century by the “shield” of the U.S. superior strategic nuclear forces. If this shield is neutralized by agreement, what restraints will then exist against Communist non-nuclear aggressions?

If such a neutralization occurs, the implications are disturbing and far reaching. Will the Soviet Union be emboldened to employ its superior tactical capabilities, secure in the knowledge of an agreed strategic standoff? Will the posture of NATO forces thereby become so untenable that the countries of Western Europe deem it prudent to move into the orbit of Soviet influence? Or, to forestall such an unwelcome move, will the U.S. find it necessary substantially to augment our NATO tactical forces? What will be the effect upon U.S. influence and interests in other friendly countries around the world?

These and related questions bring the SALT negotiations into sobering perspective. One may doubt, without in any way denegrating the importance of SALT, whether such questions have received the public discussion and scrutiny which they so manifestly deserve.

THE HOSTILITY TOWARD THE MILITARY

One of the trends in this country—perhaps the most fundamental one—which causes concern is the increasing public hostility toward “the military.” This is not the place for a full discussion of this gravely disquieting problem. Some aspects of it are alluded to in the body of the Panel Report, and a brief reference is made above to the effect on defense funding. But the consequences of a largely hostile or even an apathetic public are not limited to reduced military spending. The entire structure of our defense edifice suffers when there is inadequate public understanding and support. It may be fatally undermined where public opinion is not merely negative but aggressively hostile.

Revolution on the Campus

Already this level of hostility exists on the college campus and the virus is spreading. There is a widespread revulsion to the Vietnamese war and resentment of the draft, with its disruption of life plans. It is understandable, and in accord with our best traditions, that the young people who are asked to serve in the military forces should be concerned and skeptical. They have every right to ask why, to debate the assumptions and judgments with respect to defense needs, and to disagree with them. This right is acknowledged and should be zealously defended.

But there are militant and revolutionary minorities on many campuses who abuse this and other rights in their desire to destroy American institutions. A favorite tactic is forcibly to deny free speech to all who entertain different views, relying not on reason and rational discussion but on coercion and violence. Examples of this fascist-minded conduct are legion. They have demeaned the life and quality of education on some of the most prestigious campuses of this country.⁶⁵

The Hostility Gains Support

The greatest cause for concern is not that a few thousand New Leftist revolutionaries are on the move. Rather, it is that they—and their lawless conduct—are tolerated and often supported by a broad base of otherwise responsible students, faculty and even college administrators and trustees.⁶⁶ Many of the tactical “causes” of the New Left have acquired a broad appeal. Foremost among these is the crusade against the Armed Services, the Defense Department and—the favorite whipping boy of all—the “military-industrial complex.”⁶⁷

⁶⁵ The New York Times described the New Leftist revolutionaries as “the new Fascists of our generation.” Editorial, Dec. 17, 1969. See also New York Times editorial of June 10, 1970. Stewart Alsop has observed that the campus “is in danger of becoming intellectually a closed society.” Newsweek, May 18, 1970.

⁶⁶ Alexander M. Bickel, *The Toleration of Violence on the Campus*, The New Republic, June 13, 1970, p. 15 *et seq.* Fred M. Hechinger, Education Editor of the New York Times has stated that: “The politicizing of the campus . . . has moved the universities to the brink of disaster.” N.Y. Times, July 19, 1970. See also Dr. Nathan Pusey, *infra*.

⁶⁷ As indicated in the Panel's Report, corporations which depend in major part on defense contracts are among the least profitable of all corporations. Indeed, many corporations deliberately refuse or avoid defense business. See George E. Berkley, *The Myth of War Profiteering*, The New Republic, Dec. 20, 1969.

We have witnessed all too frequently the disheartening spectacle of avowed revolutionaries being accorded respectability by many fellow students and faculty members as well as by the national publicity so generously provided by the media. Among the most popular campus speakers are these leftists whose goal—in accord with Communist objectives—is to disarm America.

A movement of this magnitude does not remain confined to the campus. It has widened rapidly to engulf a significant segment of opinion makers in this country. Most of those who now participate in the criticism certainly do not go as far as the leftist extremists. Many remain well within the limits of legitimate comment and criticism. But the outcry against “the military” is now orchestrated with frightening unanimity—not only on the campus but by much of the media, in the theater and arts, and widely among some politicians. We may have reached what amounts to a subtle form of censorship by consensus. Few are willing to speak out in defense of the military, and even fewer in support of increased defense funding. The public figures who have the courage to present a “different” viewpoint are predictably assailed as “warmongers” and “jingoists.”

One has to go back to the days of McCarthyism to find such intolerance and repression of rational discussion of issues of the gravest national import.⁶⁸

The Consequences

The short-range consequences already are becoming apparent. Marked success has been attained in slandering the ROTC, in driving military recruiters from the campus, in denying recruiting opportunities to defense-related industries, and in some curtailment of university-based military-related research and development. The number of draft dodgers and deserters, encouraged not merely by revolutionaries but by many who consider themselves respectable citizens, is a cause for increasing concern.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ President Nathan Pusey, Baccalaureate address at Harvard University, *New York Times*, June 10, 1970. See also Dr. Pusey's Annual Report for 1968-69.

⁶⁹ It is estimated that some 25,000 to 30,000 draft dodgers have sanctuary in Canada, with an elaborate organization for getting them there. Stewart Alsop, *Newsweek*, July 20, 1970. Already some politicians and advocates of “peace at any price” are urging amnesty for these draft dodgers.

Other predictable consequences of this hostility include the adverse effect (i) on the general recruiting and retention of military personnel; (ii) the number and quality of applicants for the service academies; and (iii) on the morale and esprit of the Armed Services of our country, both at home and abroad.

There also will be an inevitable weakening of the American concept of civilian orientation of the military. Some of the institutions and practices which are prime targets of the New Leftists tend significantly to perpetuate educated civilian influence on our military affairs and establishment. One would have thought that those who distrust "the military" would be zealous to strengthen—rather than undermine—this wholesome influence.

In its broadest scope, the result of the widening public alienation from the military will be the weakening of the defense of our country and freedom everywhere. This is precisely the end desired by the revolutionaries.

The Role of Responsible Dissent

It should be made clear at this point that no thoughtful person suggests that the military, or any aspect of national defense, is above criticism. The role of responsible criticism and dissent is vital to the health of a democracy, and for the reasons pointed out by President Eisenhower there must ever be a vigilant public overseeing of the defense establishment. This is necessary to assure the civilian control prescribed by law. It is also necessary because, in a troubled world with nuclear weapons and huge defense requirements, national security is too important to leave to the military, to Congress, to the Executive Branch or indeed to any single segment of our society. An appropriate national defense posture, adequate but not excessive, is a matter of the most urgent national concern, and every aspect of it should be subjected to the widest and most thoughtful scrutiny and inquiry.

But it is one thing to exercise responsibly these attributes of democracy. It is quite something else—by resort to irrational abuse and indiscriminate criticism—to destroy the effectiveness of the only instrumentality which protects from foreign aggression the freedoms we all cherish.

A VIABLE NATIONAL STRATEGY

Unless the American people wish to accept the status of a second-rate power—with all of the probable consequences—the only viable national strategy is to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability. This can be accomplished by reversing the trends identified above, and by eschewing agreements which freeze the U.S. into a second-rate status. The margin of our overall strategic strength must be sufficient to convince the most reckless aggressor that, even after a surprise first strike, the capability to retaliate will in fact survive and be adequate to impose unacceptable destruction on the aggressor nation. This course of action is not incompatible with continued negotiations for arms limitations. Indeed, it will significantly enhance the chances of negotiations being genuinely fruitful without constituting a trap.

The Requisite Resources

It will be said that domestic needs should have priority and that we cannot afford to continue an "arms race" with the Soviet Union. The truth is that this country can and must meet both its domestic and defense requirements. If we fail in either, there is little future for America as we know it or for our cherished freedoms.⁷⁰

The U.S. has all of the requisite resources, except perhaps the will. The Soviet Union has a gross national product only half that of this country. It lacks a comparable industrial and technological base, and it has a backlog of domestic demands which—suppressed as they may be—vastly exceed those of this country. Indeed, in terms of consumer goods and standard of living the Soviet Union is at least a half century behind the U.S. In any contest to establish and maintain a superior military capability, we have an overwhelming advantage in the necessary resources.

Need for Public Understanding

But in our free democracy, as contrasted with a totalitarian regime, the ultimate defense posture is determined by the will of the

⁷⁰ President Nixon has said: "If we are less strong than necessary . . . there will be no domestic society to look after." The President's Report, Feb. 18, 1970, p. 10.

people. It is here we suffer a serious disadvantage, especially at a time of disillusionment with international responsibilities and a greater concern with pressing domestic needs. The only hope of minimizing this disadvantage is to assure a wider public knowledge of the facts and an understanding of the probable consequences of second-rate military status.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF SECOND-RATE STATUS

The American people must be reminded that basic Communist dogma contemplates the employment—over such time span as may be necessary—of the entire arsenal of pressures against the U.S. as the strongest democratic power. Despite discord among Communist states, there has been no amelioration of this doctrinal goal. Throughout the past quarter century, when the Soviet Union was relatively weak strategically, it precipitated or supported crisis after crisis—directly or through puppets and satellites—designed to extend its influence and to create disarray within the U.S. and the Free World. Throughout this time it waged, as did Red China, massive political warfare against the United States, including subversion and propaganda as well as economic and diplomatic pressures. Nor did the Soviet Union hesitate to employ techniques of military blackmail.

It is irrational to think, with the balance of military power now shifting dramatically in its favor, that the policies of the Soviet hierarchy will be less hostile, disruptive and imperialistic.

A recent study of Kremlin policy noted the Soviet effort to achieve nuclear superiority, and commented:

“Presenting the world with a clear cut superiority in numbers of nuclear weapons may appear to some leaders in the Kremlin a feasible political means for consolidating its own alliances and disintegrating the opposing forces. Such a major shift in the world-wide balance of power may also heighten the risk of confrontation, with vast costs in the present and unforeseeable dangers in the future.”⁷¹

As our country ponders its future course, drifting as we are into a position of inferiority or possibly even freezing that status by agree-

⁷¹ *New Trends in Kremlin Policy*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, Aug. 1970, p. vi.

ment, our people—as well as responsible officials—should consider the capability of the U.S. to respond in the types of situations which are likely to arise in the 70's and beyond, and which may include: (i) a Soviet-inspired and supported war against Israel; (ii) some other form of Soviet takeover of the Middle East, with its coveted oil reserves; (iii) a new confrontation over the status of Berlin; (iv) extension of the Brezhnev doctrine to selected non-Communist countries; (v) another Cuban-type crisis, perhaps in Latin or South America if not again in Cuba; (vi) nuclear blackmail over issues affecting our vital interests; (vii) the disruption, by force or other sanctions, of the international trade upon which the economic well being of our people depend; (viii) intensified levels of subversion to the point of threatening our internal security; and (ix) outright aggression against allies—in Western Europe or elsewhere—whom we are committed to defend.

It is difficult to believe that the proud and responsible people of this country would knowingly tolerate a national strategy which could invite these types of situations, leaving us virtually helpless to respond effectively. Certainly there would be no conscious toleration by a majority of our people of defense weakness which threatens national security and freedom itself.

WEAKNESS—THE GRAVEST THREAT TO PEACE

The most ominous danger of being second rate in the nuclear age is that it multiplies the chances—not of peace—but of nuclear war. Soviet or Red Chinese overconfidence or miscalculation in the employment of, or threat to use, their power may trigger such a war inadvertently or place the United States in a posture from which there could be no retreat.

The road to peace has never been through appeasement, unilateral disarmament or negotiation from weakness. The entire recorded history of mankind is precisely to the contrary. Among the great nations, only the strong survive.

Weakness of the U.S.—of its military capability and its will—would be the gravest threat to the peace of the world.

September 30, 1970